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Banks open more branches and make more lending near their Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) 
childhood hometowns. The effects are stronger among informationally opaque borrowers and 
among CEOs who spend more time in their childhood hometowns.  Furthermore, loans originated 
near CEOs’ hometowns contain more soft information and have lower ex-post default rates, 
implying that hometown loans are more informed. Hometown lending does not affect aggregate 
bank outcomes, suggesting that credit is being reallocated from regions located farther away to 
regions proximate to bank CEOs’ hometowns.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G2, G21, G3 





Individuals tend to gravitate toward places of familiarity (Proshansky (1978)), and this can 
influence their behavior, and ultimately, performance outcomes. For instance, mutual fund 
managers invest more in stocks headquartered in the states in which they grew up (Pool, Stoffman, 
and Yonker (2012)), credit analysts rate issuers in their home states more generously (Cornaggia, 
Cornaggia, and Israelsen (2020)), and corporate managers are more likely to spare workers near 
their childhood homes from industry distress (Yonker (2017a)). Building on this literature, we 
focus on the childhood hometowns of CEOs1 and examine whether bank CEOs are home biased 
when they shape the bank’s branching and lending decisions. This is an economically important 
question, not least because bank credit is a key input to the economy.  
Bank CEOs may implement policies to open more branches and extend more loans near 
their hometowns for two main reasons. First, the effects could be driven by advantages CEOs have 
in their hometowns. One possible advantage is information.2 Information access constitutes one of 
the most fundamental forces in shaping lending transactions (Petersen and Rajan (2002)). Banks 
often devote significant resources to collecting information, particularly qualitative (“soft”) 
information such as opinions, rumors, or economic projections, in order to gain a strategic 
advantage in ensuing transactions (Liberti and Petersen (2019)). A hometown advantage could 
 
1 Following the prior literature, we define CEOs’ childhood hometowns as the counties in which they were born. As 
we also know the location of the CEO’s current workplace (i.e., the bank’s headquarters), this allows us to isolate 
hometown from workplace effects. 
2 There is a large body of literature showing that locals benefit from an information advantage. For instance, Bae, 
Stulz, and Tan (2008) and Malloy (2005) show that local analysts make more accurate forecasts. Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) find that mutual fund managers are more likely to hold shares of local firms and earn significant abnormal 
returns from these investments.  
3 
 
allow CEOs to obtain superior inside information at a lower cost from their family or contacts who 
still live in the area. CEOs could therefore exploit this advantage to open more branches in their 
hometown areas, thereby facilitating expansions in local lending (Nguyen (2019)).3 Other than 
CEOs themselves possessing superior information, hometown advantages could also manifest in 
the CEO’s ability to manage local employees. For instance, CEOs could be better able to identify 
and hire skilled local branch managers. Relatedly, hometown commonality also allows CEOs to 
have more effective interactions with and a better understanding of employees in their hometown 
areas (Duchin and Sosyura (2013)).4 This could empower local employees and incentivize them 
to exert more effort in collecting and utilizing borrower soft information in order to make more 
informed lending decisions (cf. Skrastins and Vig (2019)). 
Second, CEO hometown lending could be driven by agency conflicts between CEOs and 
shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). According to this 
explanation, CEOs use hometown lending as a means of extracting rents from shareholders 
(Kruger (2015), Masulis and Reza (2015)). By actively implementing favorable branching and 
lending schemes in their hometowns, CEOs could accrue various private economic benefits, such 
as local awards, directorships, and speaking engagements, or they could gain an elevated status 
within the local community (Jiang, Qian, and Yonker (2019)). CEOs could also gain non-economic 
 
3 For instance, CEOs may have access to certain information (such as there will be a large factory opening in their 
hometown area) that would create new employment opportunities and boost local incomes. The CEO may decide to 
act upon this information and implement policies to open more branches and encourage local officers to lend more in 
that area. 
4 Duchin and Sosyura (2013) argue that social connections between a firm’s CEO and its divisional managers can 
foster mutual trust, which reduces organizational hierarchy and motivates divisional managers to make more informed 
capital budgeting decisions (cf. Cross and Parker (2004)).  
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utility from hometown lending. For instance, CEOs may favor their hometown because they are 
emotionally attached to the place where they were born and raised. Psychologists argue that place 
attachment can form a key element of an individual’s personal identity (Proshansky (1978)) and 
motivate them to invest time and money in the welfare of residents in their place of attachment 
(e.g., Manzo and Perkins (2006), Vaske and Kobrin (2001)).5 
Importantly, the two explanations offer different empirical predictions concerning loan 
performance. If the hometown lending effects are driven by CEOs’ superior information or 
superior ability to hire and empower local employees (Duchin and Sosyura (2013)), hometown 
loans should be optimal. That is, loans originated near CEOs’ hometowns should have lower 
default rates and contain more soft information compared to distant loans. In contrast, if hometown 
lending is driven by agency motivations, then hometown loans should perform worse. We also 
recognize that these explanations can be at work simultaneously. We therefore examine which 
explanation is likely to dominate on average by tracking ex-post loan performance. 
We begin our analysis by examining whether banks have differential branching and 
mortgage lending policies near their CEOs’ hometown areas. We hand-collect data on the birth 
counties of 485 U.S.-born CEOs of publicly listed banks from 1999 to 2014. Of the 485 CEOs, 
314 (65%) work for banks headquartered in the same state as their birth states, suggesting that 
many banks prefer hiring local CEOs to expand their regional business activities. To isolate CEOs’ 
hometown lending from their banks’ regional focus, we focus our analysis on 171 non-local CEOs 
 
5 In line with this, Yonker (2017a) finds that CEOs are more likely to spare workers in their childhood homes from 
the consequences of industry distress and that the effect is more salient among firms with weak governance. This 
suggests that the decision is likely to be suboptimal.  
5 
 
(i.e., CEOs who work for banks headquartered in states that differ from the CEOs’ birth states).6 
We focus on mortgage lending to take advantage of the granular Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data through which we can observe the outcome, timing, and most importantly, location 
of each mortgage application. The unit of analysis is at the bank-county-year level in most 
specifications and all regression specifications include bank and county-year fixed effects.7 This 
means that we compare the branching and lending decisions made by the same bank in two similar 
counties in the same year that differ only in their proximity to the CEO’s birth county.  
Overall, we find strong evidence of differential branching and lending policies near bank 
CEOs’ hometown areas. Within the same bank, counties located one standard deviation closer in 
log distance to the CEO’s hometown are associated with a 10.2% higher mortgage origination 
volume. We also find that banks have approximately 2.4% more branches in counties located one 
standard deviation closer in log distance from the CEO’s hometown. Moreover, the effects are 
stronger for CEOs who also complete their undergraduate degree in their birth state. This is 
consistent with the idea that individuals who spend more time in their childhood home states 
display a stronger bias toward their hometown.  
These estimations are robust even after we control for the proximity to the bank’s 
headquarters (HQ) and a large set of loan-, bank-, and CEO-level characteristics (e.g., education, 
experience, and pay elements). We also use a methodology developed by Oster (2019) and find 
that, in order to explain away the entire effects of CEO hometown proximity, the selection of 
 
6 As shown in Appendix 7, we obtain robust results using the full sample of local and non-local CEOs.  
7 In addition, we also perform loan-level regressions on mortgage approvals (Panel B of Table 2) and mortgage default 
(Table 6). Loan-level regressions allow us to control more directly for applicant-level information, such as applicant 
gender, race, and income, which are important determinants of mortgage approvals and defaults.  
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unobserved omitted variables would need to be 2.2 to 16.8 times larger than the selection of 
observables. This is highly unlikely, given that we already include a large set of fixed effects and 
control variables in the regressions. Furthermore, we also obtain robust results using a subsample 
of banks with CEO turnover events that are caused by either the death or illness of a CEO or by a 
pre-announced CEO succession plan. This set-up introduces useful variation by creating the need 
for the board to replace a CEO for reasons unrelated to local branching or lending decisions. 
Consistent with our main findings, we observe that following CEO turnovers, banks open more 
branches and lend more in locations closer to the hometown of the incoming CEO. 
Next, we show evidence of a CEO’s influence on hometown lending. As loans are 
ultimately approved by the loan officer, one could be concerned that there is little room for CEOs 
to exert their influence. However, this does not appear to be the case. First, since we find that there 
is an increase in the number of bank branches near the incoming CEO’s hometown following a 
CEO turnover, this already points to CEOs playing an active role in influencing local branching 
decisions and lending outcomes. Second, we examine changes in bank lending in response to 
severe natural disasters. As natural disasters increase the demand of credit in affected areas and 
put immediate pressure on banks to increase lending (Cortés and Strahan (2017)), banks need to 
decide whether to reallocate credit to disaster-affected areas. Given the ad-hoc nature of such 
events, all reallocation decisions need to be approved by the CEO. Consistent with CEOs playing 
an active role in shaping local lending outcomes, we observe an increase in lending in response to 
natural disasters that occur closer to the CEO’s hometown compared to those that occur farther 
away.8 Finally, we show that hometown lending is more prevalent when CEOs have a stronger 
 
8 In unreported analyses, we find that loans originated near CEOs’ hometowns following natural disasters have lower 
default rates. This suggests that CEOs expand lending in their hometown following natural disasters to take advantage 
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influence within their bank. In sum, our results suggest that CEOs play a central role in hometown 
lending. 
Importantly, while we show that CEOs have a direct influence on credit policies in their 
hometown areas, we do not discard the role of local branch managers or credit officers. Instead, 
we argue that the CEO plays a central role in the process and that the hometown lending effects 
could come from both the CEO and local employees who, as a result of hometown commonality 
and potential interactions with the CEO, might exert more effort in the lending process (Duchin 
and Sosyura (2013)). 
Having established that banks implement a differential lending and branching policy near 
their CEOs’ hometown areas, we next explore the underlying cause(s) of this effect. We find a 
collective body of evidence that supports the hometown advantage and conflicts with the agency 
explanation. First, we find that loans originated closer to a CEO’s hometown have significantly 
lower rates of default. Specifically, loans originated one standard deviation closer in log distance 
to the CEO’s hometown are 6.9% less likely to become delinquent relative to the mean default rate 
of 1.4%. Importantly, these estimates take into account applicants’ average FICO scores and loan-
to-value ratios; thus, they can be viewed as capturing incremental subjective attributes over and 
above the variation attributable to borrowers’ “hard” risk characteristics. These results support the 
hometown advantage explanation, that, as a result of superior information, banks originate more 
loans and make more informed lending decisions in areas proximate to the CEO’s hometown.  
Second, we use a methodology similar in spirit to the procedure employed by Rajan, Seru 
and Vig (2015) to examine a bank’s utilization of soft borrower information in making lending 
 
of their superior local knowledge, which is especially important to aid lending in disaster-affected areas. The evidence, 
therefore, is consistent with the hometown advantage explanation.  
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decisions. Rajan et al. (2015) argue that when more information is employed to aid lending 
decisions, the variance in the terms of the contract should increase as banks are better able to 
discriminate between “good” and “bad” borrowers (cf. Skrastins and Vig (2019)). Consistent with 
the hometown advantage explanation, we find that loans originated closer to a CEO’s hometown 
have less standardized contractual terms. Taken together, our results strongly support the 
hometown advantage explanation. This advantage could arise from the CEO’s superior 
information and/or their superior ability to appoint and motivate local employees to exert more 
effort in utilizing borrower information to make informed lending decisions.   
We find additional evidence that supports the hometown advantage explanation. In the 
cross-section, we find that the hometown lending effects are stronger among poorer, female, and 
non-white applicants. Given that these groups of applicants are more informationally opaque 
because they tend to have less detailed credit histories (Cohen-Cole (2011), Ergungor (2010)), our 
results again suggest that hometown advantages allow banks to lend more to these groups of 
borrowers. 
We also find that hometown lending has no detectable effect on aggregate bank outcomes. 
In particular, the fraction of mortgage lending in a CEO’s hometown county does not explain the 
bank’s total lending, mortgage lending, mortgage loan performance, profitability, or stock returns. 
The results indicate that credit is simply being reallocated from counties located farther away to 
counties proximate to the CEO’s hometown; on net, hometown lending does not harm shareholder 
wealth. The evidence is therefore at odds with the agency explanation.  
Finally, we conduct an out-of-sample test on small business lending and find that within 
the same bank, branches located in counties nearer to the CEO’s hometown enjoy higher growth 
in small business lending. Interestingly, this effect is only detected among the smaller loans 
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(amounts below $250,000) and not the larger ones (amounts above $250,000). As banks typically 
require small business owners to put up assets as collateral in order to secure large loans, banks do 
not need to rely on superior information to gain an advantage when making those loans. Again, 
this finding is consistent with the hometown advantage explanation. 
II. Literature and Contributions  
Our paper connects three strands of literature: on the economic effects of home bias, the 
unconventional factors that influence credit allocation decisions, and the idiosyncratic style of 
CEOs. The home bias literature mainly focuses on investor behavior and features an important 
debate on whether the home bias tendency reflects an information advantage or a behavioral bias. 
For instance, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) argue that a home 
bias reflects the investor’s information advantage, while Pool et al. (2012) find no such advantage 
in local investing. More recently, the literature has extended the home bias analysis to corporate 
managers, showing that CEOs’ home bias affects firms’ employment policies (Yonker (2017a)) 
and mergers and acquisitions outcomes (Jiang et al. (2019)).  
We contribute to this body of literature by providing evidence of a home bias on credit 
intermediaries’ production outputs (bank credit allocation) as opposed to their production inputs 
(e.g., employment decisions). Focusing on bank credit allocation is a question of first-order 
importance, given the role of bank credits in local economic developments (Celerier and Matray 
(2019), Nguyen (2019), and Rice and Strahan (2010)). Consistent with information access being 
one of the most important forces in shaping lending transactions (Liberti and Petersen (2019)), we 
show that hometown loans make more use of borrower soft information and have lower default 
rates. Our results complement those of Jiang et al. (2019), who show that context matters as to 
when the information and the agency explanations become the main mechanisms through which a 
10 
 
home bias manifests. Furthermore, by focusing on non-local CEOs, we are able to control for the 
potential confounding effects associated with banks’ headquarters locations and obtain a clean 
estimation of CEOs’ hometown effects.  
We also contribute to the literature on unconventional factors that influence credit 
allocation decisions. These studies find that credit officers may reject a loan application because 
they are in a bad mood (Cortés, Duchin, and Sosyura (2016)) or feel the urge to reject an 
application following a streak of consecutive approvals (Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016)). 
Analyzing peer-to-peer lending, Duarte, Siegel and Young (2012) find that the physical 
appearance of borrowers predicts loan approvals and that this effect is mainly due to information. 
Our paper extends this literature by uncovering a new factor—CEO childhood origins—that 
systematically explains lending outcomes. 
Finally, our study is related to the literature that studies the impact of CEO attributes on 
corporate outcomes. Various studies have found that a CEO’s life (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau 
(2017), Cronqvist and Yu (2017), and Schoar and Zuo (2017)), career experience (Custódio and 
Metzger (2014), Dittmar and Duchin (2016)), political ideology (Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014)), 
and lifestyle (Cain and McKeon, (2016), Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2017)) affect corporate 
decisions. A key advantage of our study is that, unlike education, career moves, and other 
characteristics of managers that have been previously studied, birthplace is not a choice that CEOs 
can make. Therefore, our findings can be seen as additional evidence of a manager-specific effect 
on within-firm business policies.  
 
III. Sample, Variable Construction and Methodology 
A. Sample Construction 
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To construct our sample, we combine several data sources: (1) Call Report (FR Y-9C forms); (2) 
BoardEx; (3) hand-collected data regarding CEOs’ birth county and birth state; (4) Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA); and (5) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) 
Summary of Deposits (SOD).  
First, we obtain a list of all publicly listed U.S. banks with available financial data from the 
Call Report (FR Y-9C forms) provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Second, we 
collect the names of the CEOs of these banks from the BoardEx database. BoardEx provides 
detailed biographical and employment information on the board members and top executives of 
nearly all publicly listed U.S. firms. Since BoardEx’s full coverage begins in 1999, our sample 
period is 1999–2014. 
Third, we hand collect information on the birth counties of bank CEOs from several sources. 
We start with NNDB.com and Marquis Who’s Who, both of which provide detailed biographical 
data on high-profile individuals, including CEOs. If we are unable to obtain the data this way, we 
then use Ancestry.com to search for each CEO’s birth and marriage certificates, where birth county 
information is occasionally available.9 As a last resort, we perform extensive Google searches 
using the keywords “[CEO full name] + native of” and/or “[CEO full name] + born.” This process 
allows us to identify CEO birth county information manually from multiple sources, including 
CEO appointment announcements, SEC filings, school donations, charity events, biographies, 
interviews, and obituaries.  
 
9 The richness of the information contained in birth and marriage certificates depends on the staff that complete them. 
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We are able to identify the birth counties for 485 out of 906 U.S.-born CEOs (54%) who 
work for 369 of the 738 banks (50%) in our sample.10 Of the 485 CEOs, 171 (35%) work for banks 
headquartered in states that differ from their birth states. The proportion of non-local CEOs is 
comparable to that which is reported in Yonker (2017b) and suggests that many banks prefer hiring 
local-born CEOs to facilitate their regional expansion. To isolate CEOs’ hometown lending from 
their banks’ regional focus, we focus our analysis on only non-local CEOs, i.e., CEOs working for 
banks headquartered in states that differ from their birth states. For robustness, we also use a full 
sample of both local and non-local CEOs and display the results in Appendix 7.  
Appendix 2 displays the number of non-local CEOs according to their birth states. We find 
a strong positive correlation of 0.80 between the number of non-local CEOs according to birth 
state and the state’s population in 1950,11 implying that our sample of non-local CEOs is evenly 
drawn from each state’s population. This significantly reduces sample self-selection concerns and 
points to the exogeneity of our variable. 
Fourth, we match this bank-level dataset to the HMDA database collected by the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). The HMDA database is a loan-level dataset 
that covers all mortgage applications that have been reviewed by qualified financial institutions. 
Specifically, an institution is required to disclose any mortgage lending under HMDA if it has at 
 
10 While this is a significant improvement over the prior literature (e.g., Bernile et al. (2017) identify the birth counties 
of about 31% of CEOs in the S&P 1500 sample), there remains a sample self-selection concern that we lose some 
CEOs whose birth counties cannot be identified precisely. To ensure that our conclusions regarding CEOs’ hometown 
effects are not driven by unobservable factors that make sample inclusion more likely, we address this by using a 
standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure and display the results in Appendix 7.  
11 1950 is the median birth year of the CEOs in our sample. 
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least one branch office in any metropolitan statistical area and meets the minimum size threshold. 
In 2006 (the median year in our sample), this reporting threshold was $36 million in book assets.12 
Because of this low reporting threshold, all banks in our sample are included in the dataset. 
Each loan application in the HMDA dataset contains information on borrower 
demographics (e.g., income, gender, and race), loan characteristics (e.g., loan amount applied for 
and its purpose), property type, decision on the application (e.g., approved, denied, or withdrawn), 
the year in which the application decision was made, and the lender’s identifier. Most importantly, 
we also observe the location of the property underlying each mortgage application. This allows us 
to capture the geographical dimension of a bank’s lending strategy (e.g., its lending volume and 
lending growth in a specific location) to test our hypothesis. We follow the prior literature and 
drop applications that were closed due to incompleteness or withdrawn by the applicant before a 
decision was made, and we winsorize the loan amount and applicant’s income at the 2.5% right 
tail to minimize the effects of outliers. In the final step, we match our dataset to a list of branches 
of U.S. banks from the FDIC’s SOD database.  
 
B. Methodology 
To examine a bank’s branching and mortgage origination decisions in counties near its CEO’s 
birth county, we estimate: (1) bank-county-year regressions; and (2) loan-level regressions. The 
bank-county-year regressions enable us to focus on a bank’s decisions regarding branch network 
and credit availability at the county level. In contrast, the loan-level regressions allow us to control 
more directly for loan-level variables (e.g., applicant gender, race, and income), which are 
 
12 HMDA’s reporting criteria can be found at https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/reporterhistory.htm  
14 
 
important determinants of loan approvals. The bank-county-year specification takes the following 
form:  
(1) Yikt = αikt + β1ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)ikt + ϕikt + ωit 
+ Bank Fixed Effects + County-Year Fixed Effects + εikt, 
and the loan-level specification is as follows:  
(2) Yijkt = αijkt + β1ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)ikt + ϕijkt + ωit 
+ Bank Fixed Effects + County-Year Fixed Effects + εijkt,   
   
where i indexes bank, j indexes loan, k indexes county, and t indexes year. Φ and ω are a vector 
of loan and bank controls, respectively. The dependent variable in the bank-county-year 
regressions is either a lending or branching outcome (ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), 
MORTGAGE_GROWTH, APPROVAL_RATE, and ln(BRANCHES)) defined at the bank-
county-year level. The dependent variable in the loan-level regressions is APPROVED, a dummy 
variable that equals one if a loan application is approved and zero otherwise. Our key explanatory 
variable ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)ikt is the natural logarithm of the physical distance
13  (in 
kilometres (km)) between a CEO’s birth county and the county in which the branching and lending 
decisions take place.14 The advantage of using this variable is that it captures the continuous nature 
of a CEO’s hometown bias.  
 
13 Geographic coordinates (longitude and latitude) are obtained from the U.S. Census (2014) Gazetteer. 
14 While we cannot completely rule out the possibility of neighborhood rivalries (i.e., two adjacent regions developing 
a dislike for one another), this concern would be averaged out in a large sample. In Appendix 4, we obtain consistent 
15 
 
All regression specifications include ln(DIST_HQ), the natural logarithm of the physical 
distance between a bank’s headquarters (HQ) and the counties where the mortgage and branching 
decisions take place. This allows us to further account for the potential effects of headquarters’ 
proximity on local lending decisions (Stein (2002)). In addition, we also include a host of bank 
and loan controls. Bank controls in both the bank-county-year and loan-level specifications include: 
ASSETS, LEVERAGE, ROA, TOTAL_LOANS, and DEPOSITS. Loan controls in the bank-
county-year specification are the bank-county-year averages of ln(APPLICANT_INCOME), 
LOAN_TO_INCOME, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, and %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS 
received on mortgage loan applications. Loan controls in the loan-level regressions are 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME), LOAN_TO_INCOME, FEMALE, AFRICAN_AMERICAN, 
ASIAN, and OTHER_RACES.15 Appendix 1 displays all variable definitions.   
Both the bank-county-year-level and loan-level specifications include bank fixed effects 
(Bank FE) and county-year fixed effects (County-year FE). The inclusion of bank fixed effects 
absorbs all time-invariant bank-specific factors, allowing us to compare the mortgage and 
branching decisions of the same bank across different counties, conditional on the distance 
between the county and the CEO’s hometown. Bank fixed effects also control for potential CEO-
bank matching based on time-invariant bank characteristics (Custódio and Metzger (2014)). 
The inclusion of county-year fixed effects removes all time-varying county-level factors, 
including demographic, social, economic, and demand-side factors related to local business cycles, 
 
results using an alternative variable, HOMETOWN_STATE—a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO’s birth 
state is the same as the state in which the lending and branching decisions take place and zero otherwise. 
15  OTHER_RACES is a dummy that equals one if the applicant is an American Indian, Alaska Native, Native 
Hawaiian, or Other Pacific Islander. 
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industry consumption, and housing demand (Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016)). In addition, 
county-year fixed effects also control for changes in state-level regulations, such as anti-predatory 
lending laws, that could affect mortgage origination behavior across different locations (Agarwal, 
Amromin, Ben-David, Chomsisengphet, and Evanoff (2014)).  
 With these fixed effects in place, our coefficient of interest, β1, compares the branching and 
lending decisions of the same bank between two otherwise similar counties in the same year that 
differ only in their distance from the CEO’s hometown. In other words, our regressions are 
identified by two sources of variation: (1) the varying distance between a CEO’s hometown and 
different counties; and (2) changes in the distance between the CEO’s hometown and a given 
county as a result of CEO turnover within the same bank.16  
[Table 1 around here] 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics. The average distance between a CEO’s birth 
county and the county in which the mortgage originations and branching decisions take place is 
around 1,503 km. There is also substantial heterogeneity in this distance, with the standard 
deviation being 1,042 km. The average mortgage approval rate is 60.3%; that is, approximately 6 
out of every 10 mortgage applications are approved in an average bank-county-year. The average 
borrower earns about $88,490 per year and applies for a mortgage loan of $121,700, implying a 




16 For example, in 2003, Charles Prince (born in Lynwood, California) replaced Sandy Weill (born in Brooklyn, New 




IV. Main Analysis: Does Proximity to CEO’s Hometown Affect Lending and Branching? 
A. Main Results 
In Panel A of Table 2, we present our baseline regression results that examine the effect of 
proximity to a CEO’s hometown on the bank’s lending and branching policies. Analyzing the data 
at the bank-county-year level allows us to focus on a bank’s decisions regarding branch network 
and credit availability at the county-level, which are within the purview of the CEO.  
[Table 2 around here]  
The dependent variables in Panel A include: ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural 
logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in a county-year (Column 
(1)); MORTGAGE_GROWTH the percentage change in mortgage originations by a bank in a 
given county relative to the prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the number of approved 
mortgage applications divided by the total number of applications received by a bank in a county-
year17 (Column (3)); and ln(BRANCHES), the natural logarithm of the number of branches a bank 
has in a county-year (Column (4)). 
Across all outcome variables, the coefficient estimates on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) are 
statistically significant and economically sizeable. For instance, the point estimate in Column (1) 
indicates that, within the same bank, branches located one standard deviation farther in log distance 
from the CEO’s hometown are associated with a 10.2% (= –0.119 x 0.861) lower mortgage 
 
17 This variable normalizes the number of approved applications by loan demand that a bank receives in a county-year. 
It therefore accounts for significant demand-related variations arising from the fact that there is a very high demand 
for mortgages across the U.S. in the period 1999–2006, which is followed by a crash during the 2007–2010 financial 
crisis (Gilje et al., 2016). Holding other loan and applicant characteristics constant, APPROVAL_RATE measures a 
bank’s willingness to supply mortgage credit in a county-year.  
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origination volume. In addition to mortgage lending outcomes, the model in Column (4) focuses 
on the number of bank branches, where the estimate indicates that banks have approximately 2.4% 
(= –0.028 x 0.861) fewer branches in counties located one standard deviation farther in log distance 
from the CEO’s hometown. Given the role of bank branch networks in promoting local lending 
(Gilje et al., 2016), opening branches is an important channel through which CEOs influence 
lending activities in the vicinities of their hometowns.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we augment the bank-county-year results with loan-level regressions 
that examine the effect of proximity to a CEO’s hometown on the likelihood of mortgage approval. 
One advantage of the loan-level analysis is that it allows us to control more directly for other 
important determinants (e.g., applicant gender, race, and income) in the loan approval process. Its 
disadvantage, however, is that it requires significant computing resources. Further, the loan-level 
analysis does not also allow us to capture aggregate lending and branching outcomes of the bank 
at the county level. As such, we use the bank-county-year regressions as our main specification in 
the paper.  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a mortgage application is 
approved and zero otherwise. Consistent with our hypothesis that banks lend more in proximity to 
their CEOs’ hometowns, the coefficients on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) are statistically significant 
well below the 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) 
is stable as we progressively include more fixed effects in the model. The results are also 
economically meaningful. If we compare lending by the same bank located in two otherwise 
similar counties that vary only in their proximity to the CEO’s hometown, the loans originated in 
branches located one standard deviation farther in log distance to the CEO’s hometown are 2% (= 
–0.023 x 0.861) less likely to be approved (Column (4)).  
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It is also comforting to note that the coefficients on the control variables have the expected 
signs. We find that lower income, female, and non-white applicants are less likely to have their 
mortgage applications approved. These groups of applicants tend to have a less detailed credit 
history and thus face a lower likelihood of approval (Ergungor (2010)). Overall, we find strong 
evidence of differential lending and branching policies with regards to proximity to bank CEOs’ 
hometowns. In Sections V and VI, we show that this effect is mainly driven by CEOs’ hometown 
advantage. 
 
B. Robustness of the Baseline Results 
1. Influence of Large States  
One concern related to our results is that the positive relationship between the proximity to a CEO’s 
hometown and credit activities could be driven by the fact that many CEOs grow up in a few large 
states, such as New York or Pennsylvania, and these states also have more economic and credit 
activities. While the inclusion of county-year fixed effects already controls for all time-varying 
location characteristics and addresses this problem to a large degree, we perform two additional 
tests to further alleviate this concern. First, we exclude all loans originated by banks led by CEOs 
who grew up in the top three states of origin for CEOs: New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.18 
Approximately 26% of CEOs in our sample are from those states. As shown in Appendix 3, the 
re-estimated coefficients on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) are highly significant and similar in 
magnitude to those observed in Panel A of Table 2 for our baseline regressions. 
 
18 Our results are not sensitive to the number of states excluded from the regressions. In unreported analyses, we obtain 
robust results when we exclude, for instance, the top five CEO home states. Our results are also robust when we define 
‘large states’ based on the state population or the number of bank headquarters in the state. 
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Second, we follow Jiang et al.’s (2019) procedure and run placebo tests using randomized 
CEO birth counties.19 The randomization process reshuffles CEO’s birth counties but maintains 
the original data structure by drawing CEO’s birth counties from the original distributions without 
replacement. We then use the randomized data to re-estimate the regressions in Columns (1)–(4) 
from Panel A of Table 2. We perform 1,000 simulations and plot the distribution of the coefficient 
estimates on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) in Figure 1. Panels A, B, C, and D display the distributions 
for ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), MORTGAGE_GROWTH, APPROVAL_RATE, and 
ln(BRANCHES) respectively. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Across all outcome variables, the average coefficient estimates using the placebo data are 
0.000. In contrast, the coefficient estimates using the actual data are significantly larger in absolute 
terms. For instance, the estimate using the actual data for the regressions on 
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) is –0.119, which is over 18 standard deviations from the mean estimate 
from the placebo data. The mean estimate of 0.000 using placebo data suggests that our results do 
not capture omitted variables that are simultaneously correlated with the clustering of CEOs’ 
hometowns and higher levels of credit activities (otherwise, we would still observe large and 
statistically significant placebo estimates). Overall, the findings indicate that our main results are 
not driven by large states or, more generally, omitted variables at the location-level. 
 
2. Other Robustness Tests  
This section presents other robustness tests on the baseline results. In Panel A of Appendix 4, we 
use an alternative explanatory variable HOMETOWN_STATE, which is a dummy that equals one 
 
19 We also run placebo tests using randomized CEO birth states and arrive at a similar conclusion.   
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if the CEO’s birth state and the state in which the mortgage originations and branch decisions take 
place are the same. Consistent with our baseline findings, Panel A indicates that the CEO’s birth 
state exhibits higher levels of mortgage origination volume, mortgage growth, and approval rates 
and has more bank branches when compared to other states. Panel B of Appendix 4 indicates that 
the magnitude of the CEO’s hometown effects is strongest within a small radius from the CEO’s 
birth county (the large coefficients on HOMETOWN<200KM, 200KM<HOMETOWN<400KM 
and 400KM<HOMETOWN<600KM) implying that the hometown lending effects are local. 
Moreover, the diminishing effects of hometown lending suggest that our results are not driven by 
specific locations (e.g., New York City or Chicago) or, more generally, location-specific omitted 
variables.   
Appendix 5 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables 
at the CEO level (including CEO compensation, age, and whether the CEO is an Ivy League 
graduate, has an MBA degree, was born during depression years, began their career during a 
recession, is overconfident, and has military experience) and at the bank level (the proportion of 
outside directors and the G-Index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)). 
In Appendix 6, we use a methodology developed by Oster (2019) to assess the potential 
bias from unobservable omitted variables. This test computes the share of the variation that 
unobservable variables need to explain (relative to the variation explained by the control variables 
included in the estimations) in order to reduce the effect of interest to zero. This share is denoted 






, where 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡  is the coefficient on 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) from the model using a restricted set of controls, and 𝛽𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙  is the 
coefficient on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) from the model using a full set of controls. The 




a hypothetical regression that includes both observed and unobserved controls. Based on 
experimental evidence, Oster (2019) recommends setting RMax = 1.3RFull, where RFull is the R
2 from 
a regression that includes the full set of control variables.  
As shown in Appendix 6, the values of 𝛿 range from 2.2 to 16.8, which are significantly 
higher than the robustness benchmark of 1 recommended by Oster (2019). The interpretation is 
that the unobservables need to be at least 2.2 to 16.8 times as important as the observables to 
completely reduce the coefficient of interest to zero. This is highly unlikely given that our 
regression specifications already include a large set of fixed effects and important determinants of 
lending outcomes. An alternative approach to assess the robustness of the results is to estimate a 
set of possible ranges for 𝛽, which is [*, Full], where the bias-adjusted treatment effect is * = 
Full – (Restrict – Full) 𝑥 
𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑥−𝑅𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙
𝑅𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
. If the range does not include zero, the estimates are 
considered robust. Appendix 6 indicates that all the estimated ranges for 𝛽 do not include zero, 
giving us further confidence that unobservable omitted variables do not drive our results.   
Panel A of Appendix 7 displays other robustness tests on our baseline findings in Panel A 
of Table 2. We find that none of the following empirical variations have a material impact on our 
baseline results: (1) performing our regressions on a standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure 
to account for potential self-selection biases arising from the fact that we lose CEOs whose birth 
counties cannot be identified;20 (2) excluding the smallest 10% of banks (in terms of total assets) 
 
20 The first step of the Heckman procedure estimates the probability that a CEO is included in our sample. The sample 
in the first step includes: (1) banks led by non-local CEOs that are included in the main sample and; (2) banks that we 
are unable to include in the sample due to missing information regarding CEO’s birth counties. The dependent variable 
in the first step is a dummy that equals one if a CEO is included in the sample and zero otherwise. All regression 
specifications include bank and county-year fixed effects and a full set of control variables (ln(DIST_HQ),  ASSETS, 
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since one could argue that small banks have limited geographical coverage and, as a result, there 
is no meaningful variation between the CEO’s hometown and lending locations; (3) excluding the 
largest 10% of banks since the CEOs of very large banks are less likely to influence local lending; 
(4) excluding data covering the 2007–2009 financial crisis; (5) controlling for the staggered 
deregulation of interstate bank branching laws since our results could be confounded with 
increases in lending following the relaxation of bank branch restrictions (Rice and Strahan (2010)); 
and (6) using the full sample that includes both non-local and local CEOs.  
Panel B of Appendix 7 addresses the concern that our baseline results could be driven by 
changes in a bank’s funding structure (i.e., depositors shift their money to banks led by CEOs from 
their hometowns) resulting in a deposit surplus and a higher lending growth. As shown in Panel B, 
proximity to a CEO’s hometown is not related to the local deposit growth rate. 
 
C. CEOs’ Degree of Hometown Bias 
Our main measure of a CEO’s hometown proximity is based on their birth county. This proxy, 
however, may not capture the full extent of a CEO’s hometown bias if, for instance, the CEO’s 
family relocates soon after their birth or if the CEO works away from their hometown. We refine 
this proxy and show in Table 3 that our baseline results become stronger for CEOs who undertake 
an undergraduate degree in the same state (HOMETOWN_UG x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)) in 
which they were born.  
 
LEVERAGE, ROA, DEPOSITS, TOTAL_LOANS, ln(APPLICANT_INCOME), 
LOAN_TO_INCOME, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, and %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS). The second stage of the 
Heckman procedure includes LAMBDA, which contains information from the first step to control for the unobservable 
factors that make sample inclusion more likely. 
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[Table 3 around here] 
These results are consistent with both the hometown advantage and the agency 
explanations. Individuals who study for their first degree in their birth state are likely to spend 
more time there and could have better access to information on their hometown areas as a result. 
Similarly, these individuals could also be more deeply rooted in the local community and thus 
have a greater incentive to favor their hometown for their own private benefit. Notwithstanding 
the reasons, the results help strengthen our interpretation of the hometown lending effects.  
 
D. Evidence from CEO Transitions  
As our regressions include bank fixed effects, the effects documented in Table 2 are identified via 
within-bank CEO changes. One concern with taking this approach is that CEO turnover may be 
driven by changes in bank characteristics that also affect the branching and mortgage decisions 
made near the CEO’s hometown. For instance, banks with a plan to expand to California could be 
more likely to appoint a California-born CEO and simultaneously implement strategies to open 
more branches and increase lending in California.  
In this section, we focus on two subsamples in which CEO transitions are less likely to be 
driven by the bank’s desire to change its lending and branching strategies. First, we focus on a 
subsample of banks that experience changes in their CEOs for plausibly exogenous reasons (Panel 
A of Table 4). For instance, if the current CEO unexpectedly passes away, this would force the 
board to appoint a new CEO. Given that a successor CEO would need to be appointed at a relatively 
short notice, it is less likely that the new CEO would be selected for reasons specifically related to 
local lending decisions. While the selection of an incoming CEO is not entirely random, this set-
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up still introduces some useful external variation by creating the need to appoint a CEO for reasons 
that are not plausibly related to local lending decisions.  
Following Nguyen, Hagendorff, and Eshraghi (2018), we consider a turnover to be 
exogenous if it meets at least one of the following criteria: (1) the outgoing CEO departs as a result 
of death or illness; (2) the outgoing CEO is of the natural retirement age (i.e., 60 or older) at the 
time of the turnover; or (3) the turnover occurs as part of the bank’s succession plan (with the date 
of departure announced at least six months prior to the departure). In total, 59% of the CEO 
turnovers in our sample are classified as exogenous. 
Second, we focus on a subsample of internal CEO turnovers, in which the incoming CEO 
was already employed by the bank (Panel B). Internal successions often reflect a desire for 
continuity in a bank’s strategy (Dittmar and Duchin (2016)). Therefore, the choice of the CEO is 
less likely to reflect a desire to change a bank’s lending policies. 
We estimate regressions that compare bank branching and mortgage lending decisions one 
year after the turnover of the CEO and one year before the turnover. The dependent variables are 
changes in post-turnover branching and lending outcomes (e.g., mortgage origination volume one 
year after the turnover minus mortgage origination volume one year before the turnover). The key 
independent variable of interest is the change in the proximity to the CEO’s hometown resulting 
from the turnover (∆ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)). The change in the proximity to the CEO’s 
hometown is positive (negative) when the hometown of the incoming CEO is farther from (nearer 
to) a given location when compared to the location of the outgoing CEO’s hometown. Similar to 
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the proximity variable, all control variables are the differences from one year after the turnover 
and one year before the turnover.21 
 [Table 4 around here] 
Across both panels in Table 4, the coefficient estimates on ∆ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) are 
negative and statistically significant across all columns. This indicates that banks increase 
mortgage lending (Columns (1)–(3)) and open more branches (Column (4)) in locations closer to 
the hometown of the incoming CEO. Overall, the findings suggest that resources are being 
reallocated within banks to facilitate lending in the hometown of the incumbent CEO. We further 
explore this argument in Section VI.A. 
 
E. CEOs’ Influence on Hometown Lending  
As loans are screened and ultimately approved by loan officers, one might wonder how much 
influence CEOs have over local branching and lending outcomes.  In this section, we discuss and 
conduct several analyses to show that CEOs play a pivotal role in shaping credit policies at the 
local level.  
 First, the analysis of CEO transitions in the previous section is direct evidence of a CEO’s 
pivotal influence in the credit allocation process. If CEOs do not matter, we should not observe an 
increase in lending in the hometown of the incoming CEO following a CEO turnover. Upon taking 
over the reins, CEOs could implement policies to open more branches near their hometowns, which 
would lead to an increase in local lending (Gilje et al. (2016), Nguyen (2019)). This is precisely 
what we find in Table 4, which directly points to the active role of the CEO in influencing local 
 
21 As banks do not change the location of their headquarters as a result of CEO turnovers, ∆ln(DIST_HQ) is always 
zero. Therefore, this variable is dropped from the regressions. 
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lending. Second, CEOs could exert their influence locally by appointing their friends or contacts 
as local branch managers. Third, as CEOs regularly review branch performance and intervene in 
the operations of individual branches,22 their preferences with respect to hometown lending can be 
conveyed to local branch managers and shape their influence on credit availability at the local level.  
To augment the above discussions, we conduct two additional tests to demonstrate CEOs’ 
direct influence on local lending decisions. As a first test, we examine changes in bank lending in 
response to severe natural disasters. The idea is that since natural disasters increase credit demand 
in affected areas and put immediate pressure on banks to increase lending, CEOs need to make the 
difficult decision of whether to reallocate credit to the areas affected by the disaster. As this 
requires banks to cut lending from their unaffected markets in order to have enough liquidity to 
support disaster-affected areas (Cortés and Strahan (2017)), CEOs are likely to have significant 
input in the decision or make the decision themselves. This allows us to attribute local lending 
outcomes to the CEO.  
We match data from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the US (SHELDUS) 
constructed by the University of South Carolina to our sample. SHELDUS is a county-level dataset 
that contains the date, type (e.g., wildfire, earthquake, hurricane, etc.), the severity of disasters 
(e.g., fatalities, property losses, etc.) and locations of the affected counties. To examine how 
 
22 For instance, if the CEO believes that a specific branch is growing too fast (which could attract attention from 
regulators), they may intervene by raising the concern directly with the branch manager. While such communications 
are infrequent, a CEO’s preferences (e.g., whether the branch is encouraged to continue pursuing aggressive lending) 
can be learned by local branch managers and thereby shape local lending behavior. This is consistent with survey 
evidence from Graham, Grennan, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2019), which shows that CEO values are communicated top–
down and influence the behavior of local employees. We thank an anonymous bank CEO for providing this insight 
into local branching and lending procedures. 
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proximity to the CEO’s hometown affects the bank’s response to natural disasters, we regress our 
outcome variables on the interaction between ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) and 
DISASTER_SEVERITY (defined as the proportion of the number of fatalities to the county’s 
population).  
[Table 5 around here] 
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient estimates on DISASTER_SEVERITY x 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) are statistically negative. Thus, banks are more likely to increase lending 
in response to natural disasters that occur closer to the CEO’s hometown than in response to those 
that occur farther away. As CEOs are likely to be responsible for making this decision, the results 
point to the CEO’s potential influence on local lending decisions. In unreported analyses, we find 
that loans originated near CEOs’ hometowns following natural disasters have lower default rates. 
Thus, consistent with the hometown advantage explanation, CEOs expand lending in their 
hometown following natural disasters to take advantage of their local knowledge, which is 
especially important in facilitating lending in disaster-affected areas.  
As a second test, we examine whether our baseline results differ when CEOs are more 
powerful. If CEOs have an influence on local lending, we should observe stronger hometown 
effects in banks with more powerful CEOs since they have more freedom to implement their 
preferred policies. In contrast, if CEOs are not involved in shaping local lending decisions, our 
baseline results should not depend on their power. To test for this, we regress our outcome 
variables on the interaction between ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) and POWERFUL_CEO (which is 
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the sum of two indicator variables on whether the proportion of inside directors on the board is 
above the sample median and whether the CEO’s tenure is above the sample median).23  
Panel B of Table 5 indicates that the CEO hometown effects become even more 
pronounced when the CEO has more power relative to the bank’s board of directors (negative 
coefficient on POWERFUL_CEO x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)). The results suggest that CEOs do 
indeed have some influence on local lending and branching decisions. This influence becomes 
stronger when CEOs have more power vis-à-vis the boards as this presents a greater opportunity 
for CEOs’ personal attitudes to shape branching and lending outcomes.  
Importantly, while we show that CEOs have a direct influence on credit policies in their 
hometown areas, we do not discount the role of local branch managers or credit officers. Ultimately, 
loan officers are the ones responsible for loan screening and approval. Instead, we argue that the 
CEO has a central role to play in the process and that loan officers are not acting in isolation.  
 
V. Is Hometown Lending Superior? 
A. Loan Performance  
So far, we find that counties located closer to a CEO’s hometown enjoy greater lending and better 
access to bank branches than those located farther away. In this section, we attempt to disentangle 
the underlying causes of the CEO’s hometown lending effects by tracking the ex-post performance 
of mortgage loans. If the hometown lending effects are driven by agency conflicts, then hometown 
loans would be suboptimal; thus, they should underperform in the long run. In contrast, if CEOs 
 
23 An insider-dominated board of directors is less likely to intensely monitor the CEO (Weisbach (1988)). Similarly, 
CEOs with a longer tenure tend to have a greater influence over the board (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014)). 
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implement policies to lend more near their hometowns to exploit their hometown advantages, then 
the performance effect of hometown loans should be positive. 
To distinguish between these hypotheses, we exploit a dataset compiled by Fannie Mae 
(Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance Data) that tracks the ex-post performance of 
individual loans.24 This dataset covers approximately one-quarter of the U.S. mortgage market and 
provides loan-level monthly status updates, including information on loan delinquencies. 
Following Cortés et al. (2016), we consider a loan to be delinquent (LOAN_DELINQUENCIES) 
if it becomes 90 days delinquent or enters foreclosure during the first two years of the loan’s life.25 
The analyses are performed at the loan-level. This allows us to control for loan-level control 
variables such as applicant gender, race, and income, which are important determinants of ex-post 
loan performance. All regressions include county-year and bank fixed effects and control variables 
similar to those in Panel B of Table 2. We also include two additional controls for borrower risk 
made available in the Fannie Mae dataset (i.e., the applicant’s FICO score (FICO) and the loan 
amount borrowed as a ratio of the value of the property (LOAN_TO_VALUE)). 
[Table 6 around here] 
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that loans originated closer to a CEO’s hometown 
have lower rates of defaults. The coefficient estimates are statistically significant and indicate that 
loans originated one standard deviation closer to the bank CEO’s hometown are 0.097% (= 
 
24  The Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance Data is publicly available and can be accessed at: 
https://www.fanniemae.com/portal/funding-the-market/data/loan-performance-data.html.  
25 The advantage of focusing on the early years of a loan’s life is that the borrower’s characteristics would still 
resemble those at the time of the application review (Rajan et al. (2015)). Our results are robust to using alternative 
default windows, such as three or five years. 
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0.00113 x 0.861) less likely to default (Column (3)). Relative to the average default rate of 1.4%, 
this estimate corresponds to an economically significant marginal effect of 6.9%. Importantly, 
these estimates already account for the “hard” quantitative components of loan risk (i.e., FICO 
score and the loan-to-value ratio); thus, they can be viewed as capturing incremental subjective 
attributes over and above the variation attributable to common borrower risk characteristics. 
Therefore, these results support the hometown advantage explanation that banks have superior 
information on their CEOs’ hometown areas, which allows them to originate more loans and make 
more informed lending decisions (Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)). The results are at odds with the 
agency explanation that CEOs implement policies to lend more in their hometowns in the pursuit 
of private benefits.  
 
B. The Use of Soft Information  
To sharpen our hometown advantage interpretation, we next examine whether loans originated 
near CEOs’ hometowns incorporate more soft information. To test for this, we employ a 
methodology similar in spirit to the procedure used in Rajan et al. (2015). The intuition for this 
test can be illustrated using the following example. Consider two borrowers with identical hard 
information, but different soft information content. In the absence of soft information, both 
borrowers should receive similar loans contracts. In contrast, if banks have superior soft 
information in areas near their CEOs’ hometowns, they should be able to distinguish “good” 
borrowers from “bad” borrowers and, as a result, grant more favorable loan terms to “good” 
borrowers (cf. Skrastins and Vig (2019)). In other words, when more soft information is employed 
to aid lending decisions, we should observe more dispersion in contractual terms. 
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We follow Skrastins and Vig (2019) and use three measures to capture dispersion in 
contractual terms. The first two measures focus on dispersion in the loan amount: the standard 
deviation (Column (1)) and interquartile range (Column (2)) of the loan amount of loans originated 
in a given bank-county-year. The third measure is the residual loan amount (Column (3))––the 
variation in the loan amount that cannot be explained by observable borrower information and 
other contractual characteristics.26 As the example above illustrates, the greater the amount of soft 
information used to aid lending decisions, the larger these measures. The unit of analysis is at the 
bank-county-year level, and all regressions include county-year and bank fixed effects and control 
variables, as per equation (1). 
 [Table 7 around here] 
Table 7 reports the results. Across all outcome variables, we find consistent evidence that 
loans originated near a CEO’s hometown have more dispersed contractual terms. Specifically, the 
standard deviation and interquartile range of loan amounts are 3.4% (= –0.039 x 0.861) and 2.2% 
(= –0.026 x 0.861) higher for loans originated one standard deviation closer to the bank CEO’s 
hometown. Similarly, proximity to a CEO’s hometown is also associated with a higher residual 
loan amount. These findings suggest that more soft information is being used in loans originated 
near a CEO’s hometown. 
 
26 The residual loan amount is the residual from a regression of observable loan and borrower characteristics on 
ln(LOAN_AMOUNT). The dependent variable is ln(LOAN_AMOUNT), the natural logarithm of the loan amount of 
loans originated in a given bank-county-year. The explanatory variables 
are: %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, %OCCUPIED HOMES, %REFINANCING, 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME) and %CONVENTIONAL_LOANS. For brevity, the results of this regression are 
unreported. They are available upon request.  
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In summary, our findings that hometown loans have lower default rates and utilize more 
soft information strongly support the hometown advantage explanation. This advantage could arise 
from the CEO’s superior information and/or their superior ability to appoint and motivate local 
employees. As for the latter, it is possible that hometown commonality facilitates the interactions 
between CEOs and local employees, which in turn incentivizes employees to exert more effort in 
the collection and utilization of borrower soft information. Regardless of the mechanisms, our 
findings show that more information is being used in hometown loans, which leads to an elevated 
loan performance.  
 
VI. Additional Results  
A. Bank-Level Evidence 
Having shown that loans originated nearer to the CEO’s hometown have different ex-post 
outcomes and that the effect is mainly driven by the CEO’s hometown advantage, a natural 
question that arises is whether CEO hometown lending also affects aggregate bank outcomes. 
While CEOs’ hometown advantage allows banks to make more informed lending decisions near 
the CEOs’ hometown areas, this effect could be offset by the lower loan quality in distant counties, 
leaving no effect on aggregate bank outcomes. To test for this, we 
regress %MORGAGE_LOAN_HOME_COUNTY (the fraction of a bank’s mortgage lending 
originated in the bank CEO’s birth county) on five bank-level outcome variables: (1) 
TOTAL_LOANS; (2) MORTGAGE_LOANS; (3) BAD_LOANS; (4) ROA; and (5) 
STOCK_RETS.  
 [Table 8 around here] 
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The estimates for all outcome variables in Table 8 are statistically insignificant. Thus, the 
proportion of mortgage lending in the CEO’s hometown county cannot explain a bank’s total 
lending (total loans divided by total assets), mortgage lending (mortgage loans divided by total 
assets), mortgage loan performance (bad loans divided by mortgage loans), profitability (return on 
assets), or shareholder wealth (annual stock returns). The non-results on TOTAL_LOANS (the 
proportion of total lending to bank assets) imply that CEOs do not expand total lending to 
accommodate greater hometown lending. Instead, lending is reallocated from areas that are farther 
away to areas that are closer to the CEO’s hometown. Overall, these findings are again at odds 
with the agency hypothesis and support the interpretation that CEOs reallocate resources closer to 
their hometown to exploit their hometown advantage. 
 
B. Cross-sectional Evidence 
In Table 9, we examine how the hometown lending effects vary in the cross-section of borrowers 
to further understand the cause(s) underlying the CEO’s hometown lending effects. If the effects 
are driven by the CEO’s hometown advantage, they should be stronger among more 
informationally opaque, difficult-to-verify borrowers and become weaker when the decisions are 
more clear-cut. To test for this, we interact ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) with: (1) 
LOW_INCOME_APPLICANTS, a dummy that equals one if the average income of applicants 
received by a bank in a county-year is below the sample median and zero otherwise; 
(2) %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, the proportion of non-white applicants the bank receives in 
a county-year; and (3) %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, the proportion of female applicants the bank 
receives in a county-year. 
[Table 9 around here] 
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The results in Table 9 indicate that the CEO’s hometown lending effects are more 
pronounced among poorer (Panel A), non-white (Panel B), and female (Panel C) mortgage 
applicants—these are borrowers whose applications are traditionally more difficult to verify 
because they have less detailed credit histories and require more screening effort from the bank 
(Cohen-Cole (2011), Ergungor (2010)). 27  Therefore, superior information arising from a 
hometown advantage would allow banks to better evaluate opaque applicants, resulting in a greater 
lending volume targeted toward these applicants near the region of the CEO’s hometown. These 
results strongly support the hometown advantage explanation.    
 
C. Out-of-Sample Test: CEO Hometown Effects on Small Business Lending  
Our main analyses focus on mortgage lending to take advantage of the granular HMDA dataset, 
in which we can observe the entire pool of loan-level applications, including the rejected 
applications, to separate loan demand from supply. In this section, we conduct an out-of-sample 
test and examine whether counties located nearer to the CEO’s hometown also enjoy higher small 
business lending growth when compared to counties located farther away.  
We obtain small business lending data from the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
database compiled by the FFIEC. The data are aggregated at the bank-county-year level. The 
FFIEC categorizes small business loans into three size brackets according to the amount: (1) less 
than $100,000; (2) between $100,000 and $250,000; and (3) between $250,000 and $1,000,000. 
For each size bracket, we calculate the dependent variable, ln(SMALL_BUSINESS_LOANS), 
 




which is the natural logarithm of the nominal amount of small business loans originated by a bank 
in a county-year. All regressions include bank and county-year fixed effects.  
[Table 10 around here] 
The results in Table 10 confirm that within the same bank, counties nearer to the CEO’s 
hometown exhibit a higher growth in small business lending. Importantly, this effect is only 
detected among the smaller loans (less than $250,000 (Columns (1)-(2)) and becomes insignificant 
for larger loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000 (Column (3)). As banks typically require small 
business owners to put up their assets as collateral to secure a large loan, they do not need to rely 
on superior information to gain an advantage on these loans. Furthermore, if CEOs lend more in 
their hometowns to seek recognition, the effect should concentrate among the largest loans as these 
would increase the CEO’s visibility in their local communities.28  Therefore, the findings are 




Our paper documents new evidence of a home bias on bank lending and branching outcomes. 
Focusing on bank lending outcomes is a question of first-order importance, given the impact of 
bank credits on local economic developments. We find that banks open more branches and make 
more lending near the bank CEO’s childhood homes. The effects are stronger for CEOs who also 
 
28 In unreported tests, we repeat the bank-level performance analyses in Table 8 for small business lending. We find 
that the fraction of small business lending in the CEO’s birth county does not explain the bank’s total lending, loan 
performance, return on assets, or stock returns. The results support the hometown advantage explanation. These results 
are available upon request.  
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complete their undergraduate degree in their birth state, consistent with the idea that individuals 
who spend more time in their childhood home states display a stronger bias toward their hometown.  
Consistent with information access being one of the most important forces in shaping 
lending transactions, we find that hometown lending is mainly driven by the superior information. 
Specifically, loans originated near the CEO’s hometown have lower ex-post default rates and make 
more use of borrower soft information. Moreover, hometown lending is more salient among 
informationally opaque borrowers for which information access is needed to overcome financing 
frictions. Finally, we find that hometown lending does not affect aggregate bank outcomes, 
suggesting that credit is being reallocated from regions located farther away to regions proximate 
to the CEO’s hometown. Taken together, our paper provides evidence that bank CEOs have 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
This table reports summary statistics for bank and loan characteristics in the sample. Refer to Appendix 1 for the 
definition and construction of variables used in this study.  
 
Panel A: Bank-county-level Statistics  
 
      
Variables N Mean Std. p1 p50 p99 
       
Key Explanatory Variables         
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) 291,412 7.025 0.861 4.526 7.130 8.304 
ln(DIST_HQ) 291,412 6.855 1.116 3.672 7.064 8.333 
DIST_HOMETOWN 291,412 1,503 1,042 91.420 1,248 4,040 
DIST_HQ 291,412 1,457 1,142 38.330 1,168 4,160 
       
  Key Dependent Variables      
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) 291,412 5.666 3.305 0.000 6.180 11.090 
MORTGAGE_GROWTH 225,333 -0.049 0.354 -1.000 -0.003 0.684 
APPROVAL_RATE 273,792 0.603 0.290 0.000 0.667 1.000 
ln(BRANCHES) 291,412 0.237 0.630 0.000 0.000 3.045 
ln(LOAN_AMOUNT) 265,072 4.055 0.991 1.257 4.094 6.715 
ln(IQR) 289,276 3.780 1.440 0.000 4.143 6.211 
RESIDUAL_LOAN_AMOUNT 200,046 1.030 0.884 0.008 0.805 3.938 
       
Loan Characteristics        
%FEMALE_APPLICANTS  291,412 0.201 0.192 0.000 0.191 1.000 
%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS 291,412 0.373 0.324 0.000 0.286 1.000 
LOAN_TO_INCOME 291,412 1.401 0.722 0.183 1.359 3.757 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME) 291,412 4.297 0.536 3.157 4.247 6.088 
LOAN (‘000) 291,412 121.700 190.800 8.000 92.620 606.400 
INCOME (‘000) 291,412 88.490 124.400 22.500 68.870 439.700 
 
 
      
Panel B: Bank-level Statistics  
 
Variables N Mean Std. p1 p50 p99 
       
CEO Characteristics        
HOMETOWN_UG 823 0.445 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
POWERFUL_CEO 811 0.941 0.691 0.000 1.000 2.000 
 
      
Bank Characteristics       
ASSETS 906 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.055 
LEVERAGE  906 15.470 2.085 12.230 15.030 21.330 
ROA  906 0.907 0.029 0.801 0.910 0.953 
TOTAL_LOANS 906 0.760 1.155 -5.297 0.937 2.486 
DEPOSITS 906 0.660 0.131 0.256 0.680 0.883 
MORTGAGE_LOANS 903 0.008 0.028 -0.085 0.009 0.078 
BAD_LOANS 906 0.730 0.110 0.364 0.747 0.901 
STOCK_RETS 845 0.082 0.992 0.000 0.015 0.157 
%MORTGAGE_LOAN_HOMETOWN_COUNTY 906 0.448 0.161 0.044 0.459 0.776 
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Table 2. Proximity to CEO Hometown and Bank Lending and Branching 
This table reports regressions which estimate the effects of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown on bank lending 
and branching policies. Panel A reports bank-county-year regressions. The dependent variables are 
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in a 
county-year (Column (1)); MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage change in mortgage originations by a bank in a 
given county relative to the prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the number of approved mortgage loan 
applications divided by the total number of applications received (Column (3)); and ln(BRANCHES), the natural 
logarithm of the number of branches a bank has in a county in a year (Column (4)). ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the 
natural logarithm of the distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or 
branching decisions take place. Panel B reports loan-level regression results. The dependent variable is APPROVED, 
a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is approved and zero otherwise. Refer to Appendix 1 for the definition and 
construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Bank-county-year regressions  
         
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.119*** -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.028*** 
 [-15.228] [-7.059] [-19.170] [-11.186] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.828*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.238*** 
 [-111.687] [-30.234] [-37.255] [-98.392] 
ASSETS 1.069*** 0.099*** -0.054*** 0.211*** 
 [37.296] [19.430] [-17.278] [32.650] 
LEVERAGE -8.884*** -2.519*** -1.357*** -1.682*** 
 [-16.730] [-26.631] [-22.666] [-14.386] 
ROA 0.091*** 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 
 [8.847] [11.428] [5.620] [4.246] 
TOTAL_LOANS 2.442*** 0.281*** -0.136*** -0.03 
 [20.400] [12.340] [-10.245] [-1.089] 
DEPOSITS  3.713*** -0.133*** 0.604*** 0.225*** 
 [30.183] [-6.218] [44.796] [8.443] 
%FEMALE_APPLICANTS  -0.033 -0.028*** -0.074*** - 
 [-0.821] [-3.123] [-15.428] - 
%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS -2.261*** -0.170*** -0.163*** - 
 [-88.311] [-30.039] [-51.415] - 
LOAN_TO_INCOME 0.111*** 0.028*** 0.036*** - 
 [10.091] [12.563] [28.666] - 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME) 0.574*** 0.125*** 0.125*** - 
 [32.647] [34.505] [60.400] - 
     
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.617 0.328 0.468 0.358 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 291,412 











Panel B: Loan-level regressions  
         
Dependent Variable: APPROVED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 [-8.626] [-11.468] [-17.729] [-21.516] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.006*** -0.004** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 [-3.570] [-2.342] [7.037] [7.572] 
ASSETS 0.002*** 0.006*** -0.057*** -0.050*** 
 [3.027] [7.490] [-24.391] [-24.476] 
LEVERAGE 0.150*** 0.179*** 0.216*** 0.234*** 
 [14.153] [15.508] [12.534] [16.188] 
ROA 0.285*** 0.331*** 0.234*** 0.294*** 
 [15.905] [17.611] [16.032] [21.733] 
TOTAL_LOANS 0.727*** 0.412*** -0.856*** -0.816*** 
 [14.208] [8.778] [-13.524] [-13.803] 
DEPOSITS  0.006*** -0.011*** 0.006*** -0.002** 
 [5.358] [-10.547] [4.453] [-1.991] 
FEMALE -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
 [60.429] [65.883] [51.850] [58.054] 
AFRICAN_AMERICAN -0.165*** -0.161*** -0.158*** -0.155*** 
 [-90.932] [-121.264] [-109.461] [-134.846] 
ASIAN -0.015*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.032*** 
 [-6.675] [-19.443] [-13.479] [-21.777] 
OTHE_RACES -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.135*** -0.128*** 
 [-96.644] [-102.627] [-95.262] [-99.806] 
LOAN_TO_INCOME 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [9.185] [8.321] [8.071] [6.649] 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME) 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.098*** 
 [139.071] [151.305] [158.385] [180.241] 
     
County-year FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.070 0.086 0.101 0.114 
Observations 37,946,045 37,946,022 37,946,045 37,946,022 





Table 3. CEO’s Degree of Hometown Bias 
This table reports bank-county-year regressions which estimate whether the effects of distance to the bank CEO’s 
hometown on bank lending and branching policies are stronger for CEOs that spend more time in their hometowns. The 
dependent variables are ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans 
originated by a bank in a county-year (Column (1)); MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage change in mortgage 
originations by a bank in a given county relative to the prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the number of 
approved mortgage loan applications divided by the total number of applications received (Column (3)); and 
ln(BRANCHES), the natural logarithm of the number of branches a bank has in a county in a year (Column (4)). 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the natural logarithm of the distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the 
county in which lending or branching decisions take place. HOMETOWN_UG is a dummy that equals one if the CEO 
undertakes an undergraduate degree in the same state as her birth state. Control variables include: ASSETS, LEVERAGE, 
ROA, TOTAL_LOANS, DEPOSITS, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, 
LOAN_TO_INCOME and ln(APPLICANT_INCOME). Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer to 
Appendix 1 for the definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HOMETOWN_UG x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.483*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.082 
 [-2.764] [-6.742] [-8.113] [-1.268] 
HOMETOWN_UG x ln(DIST_HQ) 0.237 -0.007*** 0.018*** 0.063* 
 [1.381] [-3.943] [13.809] [1.954] 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) 0.119 -0.003* -0.007*** 0.018 
 [0.820] [-1.942] [-6.172] [0.373] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.975*** -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.274*** 
 [-6.096] [-18.697] [-33.926] [-11.281] 
HOMETOWN_UG 1.042 0.096*** -0.103*** 0.151 
 [0.603] [5.306] [-8.506] [0.277] 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.621 0.33 0.453 0.359 







Table 4. Exogenous and Internal CEO Turnovers  
This table reports regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown on bank lending and 
branching policies around CEO turnover events. Panel A focuses on exogenous CEO turnover events. A turnover is 
considered to be exogenous if it arises from CEO’s death, long-term illness, long-planned retirements, or if the 
turnover takes place when the CEO is at least 60 years of age. Panel B focuses on internal CEO turnover events, which 
occurs when the incoming CEO was already employed by the bank. Across both panels, the dependent variables are 
∆ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the mortgage origination volume one year after the turnover minus the mortgage 
origination volume one year before the turnover (Column (1)); ∆MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the mortgage origination 
growth one year after the turnover minus the mortgage origination growth one year before the turnover (Column (2)); 
∆APPROVAL_RATE, the mortgage approval rate one year after the turnover minus the mortgage approval rate one 
year before the turnover (Column (3)); and ∆ln(BRANCHES), the number of branches one year after the turnover 
minus the number of branches one year before the turnover (Column (4)). The main explanatory variable 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the change in the proximity to CEOs’ hometown resulting from the turnover. Control 
variables are collapsed for brevity. Control variables include: ∆ASSETS, ∆LEVERAGE, ∆ROA, ∆TOTAL_LOANS, 
∆DEPOSITS, ∆%FEMALE_APPLICANTS, ∆%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, ∆LOAN_TO_INCOME, and 
∆ln(APPLICANT_INCOME). Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer to Appendix 1 for the 
definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Exogenous Turnovers  
 
Dependent Variables ∆ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) ∆MORTGAGE_GROWTH ∆APPROVAL_RATE ∆ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.237*** -0.023** -0.015** -0.012*** 
 [-5.220] [-2.047] [-2.081] [-4.290] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.833 0.896 0.841 0.694 
Observations 12,374 9,339 11,899 12,446 
     
 
Panel B: Internal Turnovers  
 
Dependent Variables ∆ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) ∆MORTGAGE_GROWTH ∆APPROVAL_RATE ∆ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.261*** -0.027** -0.015* -0.012*** 
 [-5.384] [-2.249] [-1.931] [-4.293] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.829 0.885 0.842 0.671 
Observations 12,194 9,183 11,297 12,290 
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Table 5. The Influence of CEOs on Hometown Lending and Branching 
This table reports bank-county-year regressions which estimate the effects of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown on bank 
lending and branching policies. The dependent variables are ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm of the nominal 
amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in a county-year (Column (1)); MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage 
change in mortgage originations by a bank in a given county relative to the prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the 
number of approved mortgage loan applications divided by the total number of applications received (Column (3)); and 
ln(BRANCHES), the natural logarithm of the number of branches a bank has in a county in a year (Column (4)). 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the natural logarithm of the distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in 
which lending or branching decisions take place. Panel A interacts ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) with DISASTER_SEVERITY, 
the number of fatalities divided by the county population. Panel B interacts ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) with POWERFUL_CEO, 
the sum of two dummy variables on whether the fraction of outside directors on the board is below the sample median and 
whether the CEO’s tenure is above the sample median. Control variables are collapsed for brevity. Control variables include: 
ASSETS, LEVERAGE, ROA, TOTAL_LOANS, DEPOSITS, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, 
LOAN_TO_INCOME and ln(APPLICANT_INCOME). Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer to 
Appendix 1 for the definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Disaster Lending  
  
        
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DISASTER_SEVERITY x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.026*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.018*** 
 [-2.848] [-2.116] [-0.626] [-5.956] 
DISASTER_SEVERITY x ln(DIST_HQ) 0.070*** 0.005*** 0.002*** -0.007*** 
 [9.210] [5.791] [2.862] [-2.773] 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.103*** -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
 [-11.105] [-4.609] [-15.383] [-6.628] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.871*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.234*** 
 [-102.597] [-28.349] [-32.939] [-87.567] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.617 0.328 0.468 0.358 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 291,412 
     
Panel B: CEO Power  
          
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
POWERFUL_CEO x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.026** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.031*** 
 [-2.460] [-4.896] [-0.753] [-9.976] 
POWERFUL_CEO x ln(DIST_HQ) 0.008 0.007*** -0.012*** 0.017*** 
 [0.908] [5.439] [-14.536] [6.169] 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.105*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.006* 
 [-9.578] [-5.492] [-10.392] [-1.745] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.828*** -0.029*** -0.013*** -0.252*** 
 [-80.852] [-24.570] [-15.745] [-76.537] 
POWERFUL_CEO 0.195*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.098*** 
 [3.092] [7.821] [12.012] [5.304] 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.617 0.331 0.471 0.357 
Observations 272,942 206,821 256,315 272,942 








Table 6. Loan Performance  
This table reports loan-level regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown on ex-
post loan performance. The dependent variable is LOAN_DELINQUENCIES, a dummy variable equals one if a loan 
becomes  90 days delinquent or enters foreclosure during the first two years of its life. ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the 
natural logarithm of the distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or 
branching decisions take place. All models include county-year and bank fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the county-year level. Refer to Appendix 1 for the definition and construction of variables used in this study. The 
constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level, respectively. 
       
Dependent Variables: LOAN_DELINQUENCIES 
 (1) (2) (3)     
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) 0.00123** 0.00133** 0.00113** 
 [2.108] [2.305] [1.986] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 
 [-1.753] [-1.653] [-1.107] 
ASSETS  -0.003 -0.003 
 
 [-0.765] [-0.652] 
LEVERAGE  0.211*** 0.154*** 
 
 [3.987] [2.900] 
ROA  -0.001 -0.001 
 
 [-1.047] [-1.057] 
TOTAL_LOANS  -0.013 -0.016 
 
 [-0.815] [-1.065] 
DEPOSITS   0.008 0.006 
 
 [0.540] [0.384] 
FEMALE   0.001 
 
  [1.171] 
AFRICAN_AMERICAN    0.002 
 
  [1.039] 
ASIAN   -0.002 
   [-1.144] 
OTHER_RACES   -0.002* 
 
  [-1.680] 
LOAN_TO_INCOME   0.003 
   [1.605] 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME)   0.003 
   [1.107] 
LOAN_TO_VALUE   0.000*** 
   [12.751] 
FICO   -0.000*** 
   [-28.268] 
    
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.099 0.099 0.114 
Observations 165,459 163,508 162,875 







Table 7. Contract Dispersion  
This table reports bank-county-year regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown 
on the dispersion of contractual terms. The dependent variables are ln(LOAN_AMOUNT), the natural logarithm of the 
standard deviation of the amount of loans originated by a bank in a county-year (Column (1)); ln(IQR), the natural 
logarithm of the interquartile range of the amount of loans originated by a bank in a county-year (Column (2)); and 
RESIDUAL_LOAN_AMOUNT, the residual in the regressions of observable borrower and loan characteristics on 
ln(LOAN_AMOUNT) (Column (3)).  ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is  the natural logarithm of the distance between the 
bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or branching decisions take place. Standard errors are 
clustered at the county-year level. Refer to Appendix 1 for the definition and construction of variables used in this 
study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 
Dependent Variables ln(LOAN_AMOUNT) ln(IQR) RESIDUAL_LOAN_AMOUNT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.039*** -0.026*** -0.021*** 
 [-18.485] [-6.761] [-5.614] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.131*** -0.236*** -0.064*** 
 [-71.857] [-68.790] [-19.290] 
ASSETS 0.221*** 0.354*** -0.018 
 [25.880] [21.997] [-1.246] 
LEVERAGE 1.870*** -0.953*** 1.682*** 
 [11.959] [-3.218] [6.846] 
ROA 0.012*** 0.009 0.027*** 
 [4.230] [1.557] [4.983] 
TOTAL_LOANS 0.635*** 0.847*** -0.260*** 
 [16.728] [12.709] [-4.718] 
DEPOSITS -0.034 0.642*** 0.317*** 
 [-1.028] [9.805] [4.782] 
%FEMALE_APPLICANTS  0.087*** 0.011 - 
 [6.143] [0.426] - 
%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS -0.118*** -0.345*** - 
 [-14.073] [-21.239] - 
LOAN_TO_INCOME 0.704*** 0.448*** - 
 [167.996] [63.098] - 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME) 0.969*** 0.885*** - 
 [140.735] [76.640] - 
    
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.708 0.472 0.364 




     
     
48 
 
Table 8. CEO Hometown Lending and Bank Performance 
This table reports bank-level regressions which estimate the relationship between the proportion of mortgage lending in 
the CEO’s hometown county and various measures of bank performance. The dependent variables are TOTAL_LOANS, 
total loans divided by total assets (Column (1)); MORTGAGE_LOANS, total mortgage loans divided by total assets 
(Column (2)); BAD_LOANS, bad loans divided by mortgage loans (Column (3)); ROA, net income divided by total 
assets (Column (4)); and STOCK_RETS, (closing stock prices minus opening stock prices) divided by opening stock 
prices (Column (5)). %MORTGAGE_LOAN_HOME_COUNTY is a bank’s proportion of mortgage lending made in the 
CEO’s birth county. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Refer to Appendix 1 for the definition and construction 
of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 
Dependent Variables:  TOTAL_LOANS MORTGAGE_LOANS BAD_LOANS ROA STOCK_RETS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
%MORTGAGE_LOAN_HOME_COUNTY 0.046 0.263 -2.557 1.636 -0.158  
[0.188] [1.401] [-0.972] [0.609] [-1.611] 
ASSETS -0.009 0.014 0.037 0.107 -0.010*** 
 [-0.523] [1.335] [1.075] [0.519] [-2.902] 
LEVERAGE -0.128 0.149 1.645 -18.572*** 0.023 
 [-0.580] [1.162] [0.944] [-3.995] [0.386] 
ROA 0.000 0.001 0.000 - 0.008*** 
 [-0.086] [0.717] [0.040] - [8.407] 
TOTAL_LOANS - 0.736*** -0.431 -0.071 -0.014 
 - [12.930] [-1.064] [-0.085] [-0.936] 
DEPOSITS 0.109 -0.017 -0.246 -1.714 0.000 
 [1.024] [-0.368] [-0.836] [-1.472] [-0.007] 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.177 0.643 0.035 0.274 0.390 








Table 9. CEO’s Hometown Lending and Borrower Characteristics 
This table reports bank-county-year regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown 
on bank lending and branching policies conditional on applicant characteristics. The dependent variables are 
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in a 
county-year; MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage change in mortgage originations by a bank in a given county 
relative to the prior year; and APPROVAL_RATE, the number of approved mortgage loan applications divided by 
the total number of applications received. ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the natural logarithm of the distance between 
the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or branching decisions take place.  Panel A 
interacts ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) with LOW_INCOME_APPLICANTS, a dummy that equals one if the applicant 
income is below the sample median and zero otherwise. Panel B interacts ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) 
with %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS. Panel C interacts ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) with %FEMALE_APPLICANTS. 
Control variables are collapsed for brevity. Control variables include: ASSETS, LEVERAGE, ROA, 
TOTAL_LOANS, DEPOSITS, LOAN_TO_INCOME, ln(APPLICANT_INCOME), %FEMALE_APPLICANTS 
and %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer to Appendix 1 for 
the definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Lending to Low Income Applicants 
        
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
LOW_INCOME_APPLICANTS x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) 0.022 -0.004* -0.008*** 
 [1.596] [-1.844] [-5.642] 
LOW_INCOME_APPLICANTS x ln(DIST_HQ) -0.230*** 0.003** -0.002* 
 [-21.758] [2.074] [-1.765] 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.114*** -0.007*** -0.011*** 
 [-11.872] [-5.357] [-12.542] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.732*** -0.027*** -0.022*** 
 [-88.625] [-27.406] [-31.384] 
    
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.618 0.329 0.469 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 
    
Panel B: Lending to Non-White Applicants 
          
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.206*** -0.022*** 0.003 
 [-7.756] [-4.642] [1.176] 
%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS x ln(DIST_HQ) 0.108*** 0.011*** 0.003 
 [4.830] [2.770] [1.168] 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.041*** 0.000 -0.016*** 
 [-3.168] [-0.156] [-12.403] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.863*** -0.031*** -0.025*** 
 [-83.447] [-20.046] [-24.010] 
    
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.617 0.328 0.468 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 










Panel C: Lending to Female Applicants 
          
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
%FEMALE_APPLICANTS x ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.069* -0.012* -0.021*** 
 [-1.950] [-1.721] [-3.469] 
%FEMALE_APPLICANTS x ln(DIST_HQ) 0.452*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 
 [15.011] [3.636] [5.844] 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.102*** -0.006*** -0.010*** 
 [-9.853] [-2.878] [-6.740] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.926*** -0.032*** -0.030*** 
 [-102.056] [-19.293] [-23.194] 
    
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.617 0.328 0.468 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 






Table 10. Proximity to CEO Hometown and Small Business Lending 
This table reports bank-county-year regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown 
on small business lending. The dependent variable is ln(SMALL_BUSINESS_LOANS), the natural logarithm of 
the nominal amount of small business loans originated by a bank in a county-year. Column (1) includes loans whose 
amount at origination is less than or equal to $100,000. Column (2) includes loans whose amount at origination is 
more than $100,000 but less than or equal to $250,000. Column (3) includes loans whose amount at origination is 
more than $250,000 but less than or equal to $1,000,000. ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the natural logarithm of the 
distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or branching decisions take 
place. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer to Appendix 1 for the definition and construction 
of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
  
 
Loan size Amount <=$100k 100k<Amount <=$250k 250k<Amount <=$1000k 
Dependent variable:  ln(SMALL_BUSINESS_LOANS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.642*** -0.310*** 0.072 
 [-15.559] [-5.013] [1.054] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -1.490*** -1.300*** -0.919*** 
 [-35.881] [-21.135] [-13.744] 
ASSETS 0.107*** 0.032*** -0.036*** 
 [18.299] [3.723] [-3.724] 
LEVERAGE 1.406*** 0.905*** 0.618*** 
 [48.538] [20.869] [13.250] 
ROA -1.797*** -0.053 -1.072 
 [-3.816] [-0.072] [-1.319] 
TOTAL_LOANS -0.065*** 0.002 -0.031* 
 [-6.100] [0.118] [-1.730] 
DEPOSITS 1.660*** 1.662*** 0.209 
 [15.373] [9.141] [1.021] 
    
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.585 0.491 0.499 





Appendix 1. Variable Construction and Definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
   
Key Explanatory Variables    
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)  The natural logarithm of the physical distance between the bank CEO’s hometown 
county and the county in which lending or branching decisions take place  
Various sources 
ln(DIST_HQ)  The natural logarithm of the physical distance between the bank HQ county and the 
county in which lending or branching decisions take place 
SOD 
HOMETOWN_STATE  A dummy that equals one if the CEO’s birth state and the state in which the lending or 
branching decisions take place is the same 
Various sources 
HQ_STATE  A dummy that equals one if the bank’s HQ state and the state in which the lending or 
branching decisions take place is the same 
SOD 
   
Bank Characteristics    
ASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets  FR Y-9C 
LEVERAGE  Total liabilities divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
ROA  Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets  FR Y-9C 
TOTAL_LOANS Total loans divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
MORTGAGE_LOANS Mortgage loans divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
DEPOSITS Total deposits divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
BAD_LOANS Bad loans divided by total mortgage loans FR Y-9C 
STOCK_RETS (Closing stock prices minus opening stock prices) divided by opening stock prices CRSP 
%MORTGAGE_LOAN_HOME_COUNTY The fraction of a bank’s mortgage lending originated in the bank CEO’s birth county HMDA 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE  The fraction of outside directors on the board  BoardEx 
G_INDEX Index of governance provisions developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Matrick (2003) Riskmetrics 
 
   
Mortgage Loan Variables  
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) The natural logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in 
a county-year 
HMDA 
MORTGAGE_GROWTH The percentage change in mortgage originations by a bank in a given county relative to 
the prior year 
HMDA 
APPROVAL_RATE The number of approved mortgage loan applications divided by the total number of 
applications received 
HMDA 
ln(BRANCHES) The natural logarithm of the number of branches a bank has in a county in a year HMDA 
ln(LOAN_AMOUNT) The natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the amount of loans originated by a 
bank in a county-year 
HMDA 
ln(IQR) The natural logarithm of the interquartile range of the amount of loans originated by a 
bank in a county-year 
HMDA 
RESIDUAL_LOAN_AMOUNT The residual in the regressions of observable borrower and loan characteristics on 
ln(LOAN_AMOUNT). The dependent variable is ln(LOAN_AMOUNT), the natural 
logarithm of the loan amount of loans originated in a given bank-county-year. The 
explanatory variables 
are %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME), %CONVENTIONAL_LOANS, %OCCUPIED_HOMES, 
and %REFINANCING. 
HMDA 
LOAN_DELINQUENCIES A dummy that equals one if an approved loan becomes 90-day delinquent or enter 
foreclosure during the first two years of a loan’s life  
Fannie Mae 
%FEMALE_APPLICANTS  The ratio of the number of applications from female applicants to the total number of 
applications reviewed for each bank-county-year.  
HMDA 
%NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS The ratio of the number of applications from non-white applicants to the total number 
of applications reviewed for each bank-county-year. Non-white applicants include all 
applicants whose reported race is non-white 
HMDA 
LOAN_TO_INCOME  The average ratio of the loan amount in a mortgage application to the applicant’s 
income for applications reviewed in each bank-county-year 
HMDA 
LOW_INCOME_APPLICANTS   A dummy that equals one if the income of mortgage applicants received in a bank-
county-year is below the sample median  
HMDA  
APPROVED A dummy that equals one if a loan is approved  HMDA 
FEMALE A dummy that equals one if the applicant is female  HMDA 
AFRICAN_AMERICAN  A dummy that equals one if the applicant is an African American  HMDA 
ASIAN A dummy that equals one if the applicant is Asian  HMDA 
OTHER_RACES A dummy that equals one if the applicant is American Indian, Alaska Native, Native 
Hawaiian, or Other Pacific Islander 
HMDA 
LOAN_TO_VALUE Loan amount to property value of approved loans  Fannie Mae 
FICO FICO score of approved loans Fannie Mae 
   
Small Business Loan Variables    
ln(SMALL BUSINESS LOANS) The natural logarithm of the nominal amount of small business loans originated by a 




   
County-level Variables    
DISASTER_SEVERITY  The number of fatalities divided by the county population SHELDUS 
   
CEO’s Characteristics     
HOMETOWN_UG A dummy that equals one if the CEO undertakes an undergraduate degree in her birth 
state 
BoardEx 
POWERFUL_CEO The sum of two dummy variables on whether the fraction of outside directors on the 
board is below the sample median and whether the CEO’s tenure is above the sample 
median. 
BoardEx 
MBA A dummy that equals one if the CEO has an MBA degree   BoardEx 
IVY_LEAGUE A dummy that equals one if the CEO obtains a degree from an Ivy League institution    BoardEx 
AGE The age of the CEO BoardEx 
DEPRESSION_BABY A dummy that equals one if the CEO is born between 1920 and 1929 BoardEx 
CRISIS_CAREER_STARTER A dummy that equals one if the CEO starts her career (assuming at the age of 22) 
during a crisis  
BoardEx, NBER crisis 
database 
OVERCONFIDENCE A dummy that equals one if the CEO holds exercisable stock options that are at least 
67% in the money. 
BoardEx 
MILITARY_EXPERIENCE A dummy that equals one if the CEO has prior military experience  BoardEx 
CASH_PAY   CEO’s salary + bonus divided by total compensation (TDC1) ExecuComp 
VEGA_SCALED vega divided by cash pay (salary + bonus) ExecuComp 
DELTA_SCALED delta divided by cash pay (salary + bonus) ExecuComp 
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Appendix 2. CEO’s Birth State 
This table reports descriptive statistics of states in which bank CEOs were born in. The sample covers the period 
1999–2014 for which data on CEOs’ birth counties are available.  
 
Birth State Number of Non-local CEOs Total Number of CEOs 
Alabama (AL) 2 13 
Arkansas (AR) 0 2 
Arizona (AZ) 2 3 
California (CA) 7 27 
Connecticut (CT) 3 10 
District of Columbia (DC) 2 2 
Florida (FL) 2 10 
Georgia (GA) 2 13 
Hawaii (HI) 0 3 
Iowa (IA) 2 6 
Illinois (IL) 11 20 
Indiana (IN) 12 19 
Kansas (KS) 2 4 
Kentucky (KY) 1 7 
Louisiana (LA) 0 3 
Massachusetts (MA) 6 17 
Maryland (MD) 2 9 
Maine (ME) 1 8 
Michigan (MI) 5 11 
Minnesota (MN) 4 7 
Missouri (MO) 2 8 
Mississippi (MS) 8 19 
Montana (MT) 1 2 
North Carolina (NC) 8 31 
North Dakota (ND) 0 1 
Nebraska (NE) 2 2 
New Jersey (NJ) 2 16 
New York (NY) 18 48 
Ohio (OH) 13 25 
Oklahoma (OK) 1 3 
Oregon (OR) 0 2 
Pennsylvania (PA) 13 48 
Rhode Island (RI) 3 4 
South Carolina (SC) 5 13 
South Dakota (SD) 2 2 
Tennessee (TN) 0 2 
Texas (TX) 9 18 
Utah (UT) 1 3 
Virginia (VA) 10 24 
Vermont (VT) 2 3 
Washington (WA) 1 8 
Wisconsin (WI) 2 3 
West Virginia (WV) 2 6 








Appendix 3. Excluding Top Three CEO Hometown States  
This table reports bank-county-year regression results which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s 
hometown on bank lending and branching policies. We exclude all loans originated by banks led by CEOs who grew 
up in the top three CEO hometown states: New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. The dependent variables are 
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in a 
county-year (Column (1)); MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage change in mortgage originations by a bank in a 
given county relative to the prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the number of approved mortgage loan 
applications divided by the total number of applications received (Column (3)) and; ln(BRANCHES), the natural 
logarithm of the number of branches a bank has in a county in a year (Column (4)). ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the 
natural logarithm of the distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or 
branching decisions take place. Control variables are collapsed for brevity. Control variables include: ASSETS, 
LEVERAGE, ROA, TOTAL_LOANS, DEPOSITS, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, 
LOAN_TO_INCOME and ln(APPLICANT_INCOME). Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer 
to Appendix 1 for the definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
          
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.106*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.033*** 
 [-11.692] [-5.805] [-14.232] [-11.199] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.789*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.250*** 
 [-95.108] [-20.967] [-30.775] [-95.904] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.649 0.369 0.522 0.404 










Appendix 4. Alternative Definitions of Hometown Proximity  
This table reports bank-county-year regressions using alternative definitions of distance to a CEO’s hometown. In 
Panel A, our main explanatory variable is HOMETOWN_STATE, a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO’s 
birth state and the state in which the lending or branching decisions take place is in the same. In Panel B, we use 10 
dummy variables, each equal to one if the lending and branching decisions take place within 200km, 200-400km, 400-
600km, 600-800km, 800-1000km from the CEO’s hometown (bank’s HQ) and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variables are ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated 
by a bank in a county-year (Column (1)); MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage change in mortgage originations 
by a bank in a given county relative to the prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the number of approved 
mortgage loan applications divided by the total number of applications received (Column (3)); and ln(BRANCHES), 
the natural logarithm of the number of branches a bank has in a county in a year (Column (4)). Control variables are 
collapsed for brevity. Control variables include: ASSETS, LEVERAGE, ROA, TOTAL_LOANS, 
DEPOSITS, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, LOAN_TO_INCOME and 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME). Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer to Appendix 1 for the 
definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Hometown State Lending  
  
    
Dependent variables  ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
HOMETOWN_STATE 0.756*** 0.035*** 0.053*** 0.170*** 
 [26.936] [7.696] [17.802] [22.428] 
HQ_STATE 2.568*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.573*** 
 [119.491] [32.119] [48.327] [79.936] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.612 0.328 0.469 0.321 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 291,412 
     
 
Panel B: Varying Distance  
          
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_GROWTH ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      
HOWNTOWN<200km 0.327*** 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 
 [10.919] [7.126] [14.864] [5.562] 
200km<HOMEOWN<400km 0.361*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.046*** 
 [16.851] [9.929] [13.405] [8.263] 
400km<HOMETOWN<600km 0.335*** 0.040*** 0.014*** 0.077*** 
 [17.614] [13.066] [6.975] [16.682] 
600km<HOMETOWN<800km 0.100*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 
 [5.431] [7.250] [3.913] [5.243] 
800km<HOMETOWN<1000km -0.023 0.009*** 0.004* -0.013*** 
 [-1.272] [2.898] [1.946] [-3.158] 
HQ<200km 2.871*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.680*** 
 [112.498] [25.899] [39.928] [84.851] 
200km<HQ<400km 1.435*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.350*** 
 [70.339] [14.179] [16.994] [65.780] 
400km<HQ<600km 0.871*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.249*** 
 [44.586] [6.963] [11.260] [51.205] 
600km<HQ<800km 0.357*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.126*** 
 [18.040] [2.904] [7.422] [26.360] 
800km<HQ<1000km 0.268*** -0.004 -0.005** 0.185*** 
 [14.293] [-1.136] [-2.235] [37.600] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.617 0.329 0.469 0.332 
Observations 291,412 222,552 273,379 291,412 




Appendix 5. Controlling for CEO Characteristics and Bank Corporate Governance  
This table reports bank-county-year regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s hometown 
on bank lending and branching policies. The dependent variables are ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS), the natural logarithm 
of the nominal amount of mortgage loans originated by a bank in a county-year (Column (1)); 
MORTGAGE_GROWTH, the percentage change in mortgage originations by a bank in a given county relative to the 
prior year (Column (2)); APPROVAL_RATE, the number of approved mortgage loan applications divided by the 
total number of applications received (Column (3)); and ln(BRANCHES), the natural logarithm of the number of 
branches a bank has in a county in a year (Column (4)). ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the natural logarithm of the 
distance between the bank CEO’s hometown county and the county in which lending or branching decisions take 
place. Panel A includes additional controls for observable CEO characteristics: MBA, a dummy that equals one if the 
CEO has an MBA degree; IVY_LEAGUE, a dummy that equals one if the CEO obtains a degree from an Ivy League 
institution; AGE, the age of CEO; DEPRESSION_BABY, a dummy that equals one if the CEO is born between 1930 
and 1939; CRISIS_CAREER_STARTER, a dummy that equals one if the CEO starts their career (assuming at the 
age of 22) during a crisis period (defined according to the NBER crisis database); and OVERCONFIDENCE, a 
dummy variable that equals one if moneyness of the option holdings is 67% and above. Panel B includes additional 
controls for components of CEO pay: ln(TOTAL_COMP), the natural logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation 
(tdc1 in ExecuComp); CASH_PAY, (salary + bonus) divided by total compensation (tdc1 in ExecuComp); 
VEGA_SCALED, vega divided by cash pay (salary + bonus); and DELTA_SCALED is delta divided by cash pay 
(salary + bonus). Panel C includes additional controls for bank governance: BOARD_INDEPENDENCE, the fraction 
of outside directors on the boards; G_INDEX, index of governance provisions developed by Gompers et al. (2003). 
Control variables are collapsed for brevity. Control variables include: ASSETS, LEVERAGE, ROA, 
TOTAL_LOANS, DEPOSITS, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS, 
LOAN_TO_INCOME and ln(APPLICANT_INCOME). Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. Refer 
to Appendix 1 for the definition and construction of variables used in this study. The constant is suppressed. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Observable CEO Characteristics 
          
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.167*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.040*** 
 [-20.403] [-8.788] [-16.486] [-13.714] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.720*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.238*** 
 [-88.882] [-21.079] [-21.086] [-81.388] 
MBA -0.662*** -0.066*** -0.042*** 0.011 
 [-13.445] [-8.666] [-7.942] [0.886] 
IVY_LEAGUE 0.323*** 0.034*** 0.064*** 0.009 
 [9.830] [6.549] [18.031] [1.010] 
AGE 0.014*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.001* 
 [6.567] [15.864] [-10.231] [1.874] 
DEPRESSION_BABY 0.792*** 0.099*** 0.119*** 0.043*** 
 [17.039] [10.919] [22.419] [3.563] 
CRISIS_CAREER_STARTER 0.174*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.002 
 [6.000] [11.169] [17.515] [0.331] 
OVERCONFIDENCE -0.329*** -0.056*** 0.016*** 0.041*** 
 [-8.756] [-8.485] [4.071] [5.384] 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.659 0.360 0.487 0.377 











Panel B: Controlling for CEO Pay Elements 
 
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.174*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.040*** 
 [-21.630] [-8.999] [-18.125] [-15.072] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.768*** -0.026*** -0.020*** -0.234*** 
 [-96.146] [-26.775] [-28.745] [-85.286] 
ln(TOTAL_COMP) -0.169*** 0.036*** -0.046*** -0.014*** 
 [-11.298] [13.664] [-26.633] [-3.336] 
CASH_PAY -1.204*** -0.024** -0.235*** -0.102*** 
 [-21.725] [-2.514] [-38.784] [-7.382] 
VEGA_SCALED 0.398*** -0.016*** 0.011*** -0.027*** 
 [18.304] [-3.799] [4.250] [-4.786] 
DELTA_SCALED 0.195*** 0.007* 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 [10.861] [1.804] [7.104] [3.305] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.647 0.354 0.490 0.373 
Observations 261,239 201,220 245,126 261,239 
 
Panel C: Controlling for Bank Corporate Governance 
 
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) -0.143*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.034*** 
 [-17.493] [-7.753] [-19.307] [-12.385] 
ln(DIST_HQ) -0.731*** -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.233*** 
 [-91.126] [-23.037] [-23.625] [-83.705] 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE  -0.033 -0.105*** -0.017*** 0.017 
 [-0.637] [-11.478] [-3.235] [1.289] 
G_INDEX -0.043*** -0.012*** 0 0.006*** 
 [-5.129] [-7.565] [-0.344] [2.875] 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.638 0.339 0.481 0.364 




Appendix 6. Using Selection on Observables to Assess Bias from Uobservables (Oster, 2019) 
This table reports the results of Oster’s (2019) test for the amount of variation in unobservables relative to observables 








 is the coefficient on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) from the model using a 
restricted set of controls, 𝛽
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙
 is the coefficient on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) from the model using a full set of controls. 
The restricted model does not include any fixed effects or control variables, i.e., ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) is the only 
explanatory variable included. The full models correspond to Columns (1)-(4) in Panel A of Table 2. Following Oster 
(2019), we specify RMax = 1.3RFull, where RMax is the R2 from a hypothetical regression that includes both observed and 
unobserved controls and RFull is the R2 from a regression that includes a full set of controls. The beta range is [*, 





Dependent Variables Full Model  Beta Range 
      
ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) Control variables + County-Year FE + Bank FE 16.776 [-0.112, -0.119] 
MORTGAGE_GROWTH Control variables + County-Year FE + Bank FE 4.576 [-0.008, -0.010] 
APPROVAL_RATE Control variables + County-Year FE + Bank FE 3.994 [-0.011, -0.015] 
ln(BRANCHES) Control variables + County-Year FE + Bank FE 2.193 [-0.015, -0.028] 























Appendix 7. Other Robustness Tests  
Panel A presents various robustness tests on our baseline results in Panel A of Table 2. In Row (1), we perform our 
regressions based on a standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure to account for potential self-selection. The first step of 
the Heckman procedure estimates the probability that a CEO is included in our sample. The sample in the first step includes: 
(1) banks led by non-local CEOs that are included in the main sample; and (2) banks that we are unable to include in the 
sample due to missing CEO’s birth counties. The dependent variable in the first step is a dummy that equals one if a CEO 
is included in the sample and zero otherwise. All regression specifications include bank and county-year fixed effects and a 
full set of control variables: ln(DIST_HQ),  ASSETS, LEVERAGE, ROA, DEPOSITS, TOTAL_LOANS, 
ln(APPLICANT_INCOME), LOAN_TO_INCOME, %FEMALE_APPLICANTS, and %NON_WHITE_APPLICANTS. 
The second step of the Heckman procedure includes LAMBDA, which contains information from the first step to control 
for the unobservable factors that make sample inclusion more likely. We exclude the 10% smallest banks (Row (2)); exclude 
the 10% largest banks (Row (3)); exclude observations covering the 2007-09 financial crisis (Row (4)); control for the 
staggered deregulation of interstate bank branching laws (Rice and Strahan 2010) (Row (5)); and include both local and 
non-local CEOs in the sample (Row (6)). Panel B reports regressions which estimate the effect of distance to the bank CEO’s 
hometown on DEPOSIT_GROWTH, the percentage change in total deposits a bank receives in a given county relative to 
the prior year. For brevity, we only display the estimates and t-statistics for ln(DIST_HOMETOWN). ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Robustness Tests on Baseline Results (Panel A of Table 2) 
 
Dependent Variables ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) MORTGAGE_GROWTH APPROVAL_RATE ln(BRANCHES) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
(1) Heckman (1979) two-step procedure -0.109*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.028*** 
 [-14.191] [-7.125] [-18.063] [-10.891] 
(2) Excluding the 10% smallest banks -0.132*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.029*** 
 [-16.869] [-7.628] [-19.700] [-11.331] 
(3) Excluding the 10% largest banks -0.073*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.031*** 
 [-8.917] [-5.555] [-9.009] [-12.203] 
(4) Excluding the 2007-9 financial crisis -0.143*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.032*** 
 [-16.201] [-6.236] [-16.552] [-11.829] 
(5) Controlling for IBBEA deregulation  -0.134*** -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.034*** 
 [-12.768] [-8.466] [-7.037] [-9.806] 
(6) Including local and non-local CEOs  -0.258*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.035*** 
 [-42.792] [-13.809] [-29.227] [-19.748] 
     
 
 
Panel B: Placebo Test on Deposit Growth  
 








Control variables  Yes 
County-year FE Yes 







Figure 1: Placebo Tests  
Figure 1 displays the distributions of the coefficient estimates on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN) from placebo regressions 
using specifications from Panel A of Table 2. The placebo process reshuffles CEO’s birth counties 1000 times but 
maintains the original data structure by drawing CEO’s birth counties from the original distributions without 
replacement. The dependent variables are ln(MORTGAGE_LOANS) (Panel A), MORTGAGE_GROWTH (Panel B), 
APPROVAL_RATE (Panel C), and ln(BRANCHES) (Panel D).  
 




































-.006 -.004 -.002 0 .002 .004
Coefficient Estimate on ln(DIST_HOMETOWN)
